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PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO COMPENSATION
MR. LURIE:
Good morning. I don't know whether I'm more happy to be here
this morning sharing a platform with two old friends of mine, Carr
Ferguson and Merv Wilf, or a friend of Judge Powell's. Carr and I
share Cornell, each with a double degree. That place must breed
informality. He took his jacket off. I'm going to open my vest.
Merv's remarks recall to me the old Mack Sennett Comedies. I
think a verity for any comedy is our tendency to laugh at other peo-
ple's misery. You notice that Merv's biggest laugh this morning came
when he spoke about the 23 months' of income he was suffering in
one taxable year. I'm inclined to think we will probably be laughing
at the misery of some professional corporations, or the shareholder-
employees of professional corporations, who thought that they could
take reasonable compensation, and found to their surprise that what
they thought was reasonable or compensation was neither of those
things.
I think that is, at least, the principal threshold problem in the pro-
fessional corporation area. You can talk about sections 269 and 482,
but to me the problem that is stopping more professionals in my back-
wards state of New York, which as Carr says has only recently come
into the professional corporation era, is the worry about what is al-
lowable compensation for the stockholder-employees.
Perhaps I'm over reacting; but the McCandless' case, which Carr
mentioned lightly as a backwards approach, is, to me, a very upside-
down kind of a case. Maybe I should take a lesson from my young
son, who seems at the age of eight to be more philosophical than I.
Recently I had occasion to yank him up by the heels as he was watch-
ing a television program. This didn't disturb him. He continued to
watch the program, and as a Pillsbury Cake commercial was flashed on
the screen, he said "Oh look, and upsidedown cake." Perhaps the
McCandless case is just an upsidedown case, and I should take it with
no more dismay than my son took my sudden upturning of his view
of the cake commercial. But I'm inclined to take it somewhat more
seriously. I think it's a very serious case.
The regulations dealing with compensation, typical regulations that
apply to all corporations and all compensation, ask only that the com-
pensation satisfy two tests: one, that it be reasonable, and, two, that
the payment actually be intended as compensation. The cases have
apparently accepted the view that even a reasonable amount, won't
be allowable if it's not really paid as compensation for personal serv-
ices, and that an amount, even though intended as compensation, the
court having no quarrel with the form of the transaction or the bona
fide intentions of the parties, may nevertheless not stand as compen-
1 Charles McCandless Tile Service v. U.S., 422 F.2d 1336 (1970).
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sation where a reasonable return on capital has not been provided.
That is now called, among lawyers that love to coin simple terms
for complex things, the "automatic dividend" rule.
It is important to note that this particular case (McCandless) was not,
as I read it, even a case involving personal services. McCandless, which
was decided by the Court of Claims a couple years ago, involved a
tile contracting firm. There the court found that the salaries paid to
the principals who were shareholder-employees and who had developed
the business (I think it was a father and son) were not only reason-
able, they were actually below the national norms for compensation
for executives in this type of contracting business; and the court found
that it was therefore a completely reasonable salary. But what the
court said in that case is that even a reasonable payment may not be
deductible to the extent it's really a distribution of earnings.
I think a quote from the case itself is perhaps the most vivid dem-
onstration of how far the court did go when it said: "The absence of
a return on capital is conspicuous and indicative that the purported
compensation payments necessarily contain a distribution of corporate
earnings therein."
Now Carr has said that this might be a modest price to pay for the
privilege of enjoying the so-called goodies of incorporation if you're
at the 22% corporate bracket. But I submit to you that many law
firms and other professional concerns that will be considering this
problem may very well have a million dollars of earnings, that is to
say after they have paid all of the overheads. And if they applied the
McCandless test (McCandless, without offering any rationale for its
mathematics, said that the appropriate return on capital that would
be imputed to the shareholder-employee was 15% of the net profits,
without any reference to actually how much capital was invested)
then even though they were to follow Carr's advice of 'think thin' and
'keep lean,' (that obviously would keep the capital down), it wouldn't
make any difference at all. Because in McCandless the court was look-
ing for return on capital merely in terms of a percentage of profits.
If you haven't a million dollars of earnings for a firm, mind you this
is not per partner, when twenty partners get together it's not that
unusual for them to produce a million dollars of earnings among them.
And if the dividend tariff on that is $150,000 (at the 15% rate), then
you are paying a corporate tax completely beyond what anybody,
I'm sure, would be willing to consider. So I think you must seriously
consider this problem, this risk of an automatic dividend or imputing
of a return on capital to the partners that go into the professional
corporation.
Well, that was the McCandless case. It's not the most recent. The
field is beginning to proliferate with authority. The Barton-Gillet
case2 was decided in the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the only
2 Barton-Gillet Co., 442F.2d 1343 (1971), aff'g per cur. T.C. memo. 1970-757.
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case in the area where a court of appeals, to my knowledge, has ac-
tually spoken, and they've spoken only terribly tersely, they've spoken
per curiam: affirmed without opinion the memorandum decision of
the Tax Court; but let's look at the Barton-Gillet case.
There the salary was held to be unreasonable. Now, again, in Barton-
Gillet we're not dealing with a professional corporation. "I want to
make that perfectly clear." It involved a commercial printer, largely
personal services. The services of the son of the founder was being
dealt with. The court held that the salary was unreasonable. Mind
you, there was a finding of unreasonableness; but let's see how the
court reached that "unreasonable" finding. They said, first of all, that
in a personal service business some return on capital is proper, even
though they conceded it would be less than would be proper in a
manufacturing business. Some return on capital is proper, said the
court, and they cited McCandless.
The court, then looked at the relationship between the salaries being
paid, and both the gross profit and the net profit. The court said they
were disturbed by the relationship in this case, where they found in
some years that the compensation exceeded 50% of profits. Now there
are obviously many instances in which it is perfectly appropriate that
compensation may represent close to 100% of net profits. Indeed,
hardly is this an unusual situation. Corporations could operate at a
loss by reason of a need to pay reasonable compensation. Yet, in this
case the court really wasn't talking about whether this compensation
exceeded national norms, as in the Pepsi Cola case,3 for example, where
the Tax Court tried to look at what were national norms of compen-
sation. What they said here is simply that the relationship suggested
unreasonable compensation, without indicating or spelling out why.
The second factor that the court was troubled by was the fact that
no dividends had been paid. Those two factors were why the court
arrived at the convenient determination, convenient in terms of fall-
ing into more traditional tax concepts, of unreasonable salary. But the
unreasonable salary in Barton-Gillet was probably no different than
the reasonable salary in many other cases. The court merely hung on
the unreasonable peg to justify its decision. And therefore I don't
think that you can dismiss Barton-Gillet as being a perfectly garden
variety determination that unreasonable compensation will not be
allowed. The basis of unreasonableness was largely that there wasn't
return on capital. So you have the McCandless doctrine in kind of a
disguised setting.
Now the most recent case of all is Nor-Cal,4 a Tax Court memoran-
dum decision. (I emphasize "memorandum" for the obvious reason
that memorandum decisions are not normally accorded as having prec-
3 Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp, 48 T.C. 75 (1967), rev'd 399 F.2d 390 (CA2,
1968).
4 Nor-Cal Adjusters, T.C. Memo. 1971-200.
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edential value, but nevertheless these "nonprecedential" cases do tend
to get loose and spread their doctrine.) Now in Nor-Cal, though the
court determined that the salary was reasonable, in fact very modest-
what was involved was a bonus payment spread among four partners.
The total bonus was $13,000 and was divided among four people. Some
of them were getting two or three thousand dollars bonus, and the
compensation to which the bonus had been geared was conceded by
the court to be reasonable. It's not quite clear whether in Nor-Cal
the court viewed the basic salary and the bonus together as reasonable,
but they clearly conceded that the basic salary was reasonable; and the
bonus added two or three thousand dollars, so I could scarcely imagine
that that would have tipped it over to unreasonable.
So we had a case of a reasonable bonus; but the court said the bonus
will not be deductible under these circumstances where it was not
intended as compensation, but rather as a distribution of profits. Now
I will agree that in the Nor-Cal case the court was able to point to
circumstances that tainted the bonus. It was a clumsily done job. The
bonus was paid periodically during the year in dribs and drabs. Ob-
viously you will appreciate that the total bonus was itself only a drib
when I tell you it was only $13,000. But they would dole out $1,000
in March, and $2,000 in June, and so on. So without any predeter-
mined pattern of paying, formula for paying the amounts, the court
said it looked like when cash was available, they turned it out to the
partners. One could dismiss the Nor-Cal case too, as not being that
significant, as merely an instance of a clumsy bonus. And as such, the
case would have limited significance. However, the court, it seems to
me, is dealing once again with this basic problem of a reasonable salary
in a modest amount, which the court nevertheless finds unallowable.
Moreover, the case does echo the McCandless doctrine. The court
says specifically that an investor normally expects a return on capital,
and the absence of dividends invites scrutiny. So while there are differ-
ences in the facts and one can distinguish the cases, you nevertheless
have, in my view, again a McCandless type case.
This, again, was not a case involving a professional corporation.
There are, in fact, two cases that really do involve professional cor-
porations which invite our attention. Now somewhat old, in the way
tax cases go (they are about ten years old, which seems like eons ago),
one of them, the most important, is the Klamath5 case, a 9th Circuit
decision affirming the Tax Court. There what you had was an am-
biguous employment agreement. I don't want to take the time to go
into the factual determinations, you can read the Klamath case. The
significant thing in Klamath was that there was a group of doctors that
formed a medical association for the purpose of providing medical
5 Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 29 T.C. 339 (1952), aff'd 261 F.2d 842 (CA,
1959) cert. den. 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
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service on a prepaid contract basis; and also, besides that, the Klamath
organization provided hospital care.
There were ambiguities in the relationship. There was a schedule
of fees, and the doctors agreed-all the doctors of that particular
county belong to the Klamath Medical Service Bureau. And they
all held stock, but they paid a hundred dollars a share for that stock.
They were stockholders only in a very nominal way. All of the com-
pensation paid to these doctors that was challenged successfully in the
Klamath case involved amounts paid for services, and the basic ques-
tion in Klamath was whether the amount paid to these doctors over
their billings, over the part allocable to them as billings, was excessive
compensation. You see, under this ambiguous agreement they agreed
to render services per schedule. That was the relationship, the so-
called employment arrangement, between doctor and association. In
addition, the association had subscriber contracts. Under that the
subscriber was told that the doctor will perform services per schedule.
Now the court construed this as an instance in which the doctors
agreed to be paid only such and such an amount as their compensa-
tion. And, therefore, it could hold that anything they received over
the amount they agreed to take per schedule was in effect a volun-
teered payment, was almost gratuitous. In fact, one of the grounds
on the basis of which the circuit court affirmed the Tax Court was
that it wasn't an ordinary and necessary payment because not having
been obligated contractually, the amount paid over 100% of the bill-
ings couldn't be necessary. To my mind a very specious holding; a
throwaway point, but it's there. So one could again dismiss the Klamath
case as essentially involving that rather simple proposition; but I think
it would be dangerous to do so.
I think it could also be dangerous to ignore the Kiamath case simply
because it's ten years old. It is at the present time the only significant
professional corporation case. There were findings that the amounts
paid to these doctors, even though exceeding for the individual doc-
tors 100% of their billings, were perfectly reasonable, and below what
the doctors might have experienced in private practice. Nevertheless,
said the court, the payments fell before the challenge of the Commis-
sioner on the ground that they were not in fact reasonable to the extent
that they exceeded what the court held was the amount the doctors
agreed to receive, which was 100% of their billings. As I say, a very
questionable determination, but nevertheless one that might distin-
guish the Klamath case.
Now the only other case that I think you must be aware of at the
present time in this area is McClung Hospital Inc.6 McClung again was
a doctor case, a professional corporation of an early vintage, 1960; and
100% of the billings in the aggregate were paid to two doctor share-
holder-employees. There were only two shareholder-employees.
ITC Memo. 1960-86.
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(Well, there were three. The third was the father, who at the age of
70 was receiving compensation; and the case to an unimportant extent
deals with the compensation paid to the father.) The importance of
the case is its holding as to the compensation paid to the two doctor
sons, who really carried on the practice. In the McClung case, it's
important to know, the court sustained the compensation against the
challenge of the Commissioner. The Commissioner agreed that 100%
of billings, paid as compensation, was inappropriate because it didn't
take into account the overhead expenses of operation. The Commis-
sioner further agreed that even though 100% of the billings were paid
in aggregate, in one case one doctor got more than 100% and one
doctor got less than 100%; but the Tax Court wasn't persuaded by that
fact either. So much for the cases. 7
Now, I'm going to, quickly I'm afraid, race through what I think
are some of the propositions that we have to be concerned about as a
result of these cases, and general considerations that these cases sug-
gest. Of course, the principal problem we must beware of is the
"automatic dividend rule." Is there a McCandless rule in the field?
The most direct statement I have found against this is provided by
the Court of Claims itself-the same Court where McCandless was
decided-in the Bringwald case,8 where the Court said it rejected the
Government's contention that "the low rate of return realized by
the taxpayer and the fact that it never paid any dividend support an
inference that the disputed (salary) payments constitute a distribution
of the profits." Though McCandless has been cited approvingly sev-
eral times in recent Tax Court decisions, and its philosophy of the
right-to-a return has, as we have seen, been echoed, its "automatic
dividend" rule has not actually been applied to decide any other case.9
I think that even if there were to develop an "automatic dividend"
rule generally, remember that McCandless did not involve a profes-
sional corporation case, and apparently didn't even involve a personal
service case and so there's a good question in my mind whether the
rule would apply in case of a professional corporation, where it's gen-
erally recognized that capital is not a material income-producing fac-
tor. There are instances where this is recognized in the Code itself.
Section 911, and now section 1348, both recognize as a basic propo-
sition that a professional group, even though employing assistants and
even though utilizing sophisticated equipment, nevertheless by its
nature is not a business in which capital is material; and therefore all
of the earnings of such an entity qualify as "earned income." Now if
all of those earnings are earned income for purposes of 1348 (that is a
7 For survey of additional post-McCandless cases, see Tax Management Mem-
orandum, "Reasonable Compensation-Recent Developments," TMM 72-01 (Jan.
10, 1972).
8 Bringwald, Inc. v. U.S., 334 F.2d 639 (1964).
9 See TMM 72-01, supra n.7.
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compensation test under 1348, it is compensation for personal services
that gives the right to enjoy the maximum tax limitations of 1348),
if the proposition is established there, it seems to me that one has a
very strong argument that in the professional corporation area, capital
is not a material income-producing factor, and that fact alone might
provide you with a basis for distinguishing the McCandless doctrine,
and Nor-Cal and Barton-Gillet, assuming those cases were to be applied
in the professional corporation area.
The next point is: even if some return on capital is appropriate,
must this return on capital be paid out? Isn't it perfectly acceptable
for the earnings to be retained, that is, that the investor, to the extent
that he is looking for a return on capital, leaves his capital in the busi-
ness? Mind you in McCandless there was a payout test. The court
said that the investor was looking for a paid-out return on capital,
not merely an increment to his investment. I submit that proposition
is extremely dubious. It's one thing to say a return on capital is what
an investor looks for. It's another thing to say that necessarily one
must constructively impute to him the receipt of the return on capital
in the form of a distribution.
Now a few other propositions quickly, because time is running and
I don't want to infringe on the time of the next speaker. If there is
a return-on-capital rule, an "automatic dividend" rule, what is the
capital base to which this return on capital must be constructed. Carr,
to my mind very correctly and properly, suggested to you that the
best approach-for other reasons as well, but certainly in the compen-
sation area too-is to keep the capital lean and trim. To that extent,
the return on capital will presumably commensurately be lean and
trim; although bear in mind again that in McCandless it wasn't a re-
turn on capital invested, as such, but merely a test of a percentage of
profits that the court used without regard to how much the capital
was. But nevertheless it can't hurt to keep capital trim.
Now the question is, assuming you have capital, is it the original
capital, is it depreciated capital, and does it include goodwill? Is
goodwill a part of capital? How can goodwill be an element of cap-
ital? Well, Martin Worthy, in one of his early statements on this
point as Chief Counsel of the Service, in fact stated that one must
take into account goodwill, and strongly suggested that goodwill
might represent an appropriate element to be compensated for over
and above compensation for personal services.'0
Next, what is the measure of a return on capital? In the McCandless
case, remember, it was 15% of profits without any rationale, without
any basis. In Martin Worthv's remarks in the Journal of Taxation,
in February of '70, he spoke of a minimum of 15% of capital, by which
he meant the actual capital invested. He suggested that might be an
10 "What Lies Ahead for Professional Corporations," J. Taxation (Feb. 1970)
88, at 91.
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appropriate return for an investor, when you have high interest rates
for loans running as high as 10% at the time he was speaking. The
speakers this afternoon will be dealing with real estate shelters. Under
various situations-the rent control situation in New York, for exam-
ple-an 8% return on capital is deemed appropriate, and it's not even
an 8% return, it's 6-and-2 with 2% representing an amortization ele-
ment. Why, then, did that government spokesman believe a 15%
return on capital is a minimum return for an investor?
It seems to me that in these cases of professional corporations and
professional partnerships, where partners put in excess capital by way
of loans, and those cases where the partnership agreement provides
that some kind of an interest factor is paid to those partners with excess
capital, one might see something like 7% or 8%. Query, isn't that a
more appropriate figure as a return on capital if you are going to use
a return on capital at all. So there is a great deal of variation and
question as to just what is the appropriate number, multiplier.
How can you limit this number? How can you limit this return
on capital? Well, obviously, to the extent that you establish interest-
bearing loans in lieu of actual capital investments, and you describe
a rate of interest on the loan, you both have a deduction to the cor-
poration and the amount presumably has been prescribed by a con-
tractual agreement. I would suppose in those cases the Commissioner
would have considerable difficulty overturning that rate of interest.
One suggestion I have heard is to have a partnership lease its prop-
erties, its goodwill and other properties, to the corporation. I suspect
that there would be a serious question of respect for the entity, and
the Commissioner would obviously not stand by idly and say, "oh yes.
that's a corporation and that's a partnership, and never the twain shall
meet." He would tend to throw the two together in a single entity,
and look at it as a composite picture; and I don't think the siphoning
off of earnings through the royalty route by any means avoids the
problem. I think perhaps, in fact, it might tend to highlight a prob-
lem. But I say this on the basis of a very superficial analysis of the
device. If they are doing it out west as I have heard, I don't neces-
sarily subscribe to H. L. Mencken's aphorism about how his respect
for the east grew the farther west he went.
I regret that there are too many other aspects of this problem which
though worthy of consideration (including, for example, the ques-
tion whether Subchapter S is the way out) are outside my time limit.
